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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-THE FIREMAN'S RULE-
PUBLIC POLICY OR PREMISES LIABILITY? THE
PROPER BASIS FOR THE FIRE FIGHTER'S RULE IN
MARYLAND. Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 633
A.2d 84 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
By the nature of their occupation, fire fighters and police officers
face serious hazards resulting from other persons' negligent acts. The
fireman's rule, however, generally precludes a police officer or fire
fighter from recovering damages from tortfeasors for negligence
encountered as a result of such occupational duties.' The Court of
Appeals of Maryland most recently addressed Maryland's application
of this rule in Southland Corp. v. Griffith.
2
David Griffith, an off-duty police officer, his son, and several
friends purchased food at a 7-11 convenience store owned by the
Southland Corporation.' In the parking lot outside the store, Griffith
confronted and then attempted to arrest several teenagers who were
throwing beer bottles and harassing a female passenger waiting in
Griffith's car.4 As a result of his unsuccessful attempt to arrest them,
Griffith was severely beaten by the teenagers.' Griffith claimed that
his son had asked the store clerk to call the police for backup on
three occasions during the confrontation, but -the clerk failed to make
the call promptly. 6
The trial court found that Griffith ceased to be off-duty once
he attempted to make the arrest. 7 The trial court therefore concluded
that the fireman's rule was effective from the time Griffith announced
he was a police officer, and that Southland was not liable for
Griffith's injuries.' The court granted summary judgment in South-
land's favor. 9
1. See Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Ptnshp., 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361
(1987).
2. 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
3. Id. at 707, 633 A.2d at 85.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 708, 633 A.2d at 85-86.
6. Id. at 708, 633 A.2d at 86.




In reversing the lower court and allowing Griffith to recover
damages from the convenience store, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland held that the fireman's rule was inapplicable to this
situation.' 0 The court found that the clerk's failure to call 911 was
analogous to a "hidden danger," thus bringing the case into an
exception to the rule." The fireman's rule generally precludes an
officer from recovering for negligence encountered as a result of
occupational duties, however the "hidden danger" exception permits
recovery of damages for unanticipated occupational risks.12
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the
intermediate appellate court that the fireman's rule did not preclude
Griffith from recovery, 3 Maryland's highest court based its conclu-
sion on different grounds. The court of appeals looked to the reason
for the officer's presence at the 7-11; the officer entered the premises
to purchase food, not to fight crime.' 4 The court never reached the
issue of whether the fireman's rule applied, as the officer was held
to be a "business invitee" to whom the shopkeeper owed a duty of
reasonable care. 5 Although there is generally no duty to aid another
person in peril,' 6 the court held for the first time that there is a
special relationship between shopkeepers and business invitees that
gives rise to an affirmative duty to aid.'
7
The court of appeals' decision in Griffith is troublesome because
its rationale suggests a reversion to the premises liability basis for
the fireman's rule, which was explicitly abandoned, prior to Griffith,
by the Maryland court in Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd.
Partnership, '" in favor of a public policy rationale. As the rule now
exists under Griffith, the confusion that Flowers attempted to erad-
icate as to the proper basis and application of the fireman's rule will
inevitably resurface in lower court decisions. By failing to follow and
10. Griffith v. Southland Corp., 94 Md. App. 242, 253, 617 A.2d 598, 604 (1992),
aff'd, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
11. Id. at 253, 617 A.2d at 603-04.
12. Id.
13. Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
14. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89. Griffith was off-duty at the time he arrived at the
7-11. Id. at 707, 633 A.2d at 85. In opposition to Southland's motion for
summary judgment, Griffith argued that the fireman's rule was inapplicable
because the rule does not apply to an off-duty police officer "whose status
was that of a volunteer." Id. at 709, 633 A.2d at 86. The trial court found
that Griffith was no longer 'off-duty' when he undertook to make the arrest."
Id. at 710, 633 A.2d at 87.
15. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89. According to the court of appeals, this duty of
reasonable care was not met when the clerk failed to call 911 as requested. Id.
at 720, 633 A.2d at 91-92.
16. Id. at 716, 633 A.2d at 90.
17. Id. at 719, 633 A.2d at 91.
18. 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
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clarify the application of the Flowers rule, the court missed an
opportunity to develop a limited and consistent approach to the
fireman's rule. Further, the court of appeals did not fully address
the holding by the court of special appeals that gave employees an
affirmative duty to call 911 at the request of an officer in peril.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fireman's Rule
To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, 20
that the defendant breached that duty, that injury was suffered by
the plaintiff, and that the injury proximately resulted from the breach
of that duty. 2' There are, however, exceptions to the general rule of
recovery for negligence, even when all four elements are met. Mar-
yland, like most jurisdictions, adopted the fireman's rule, 22 which
generally precludes fire fighters and police officers23 from recovering
damages for negligence when the injury occurred while protecting
the public.
24
The fireman's rule traces its origins back more than a century
under the common law to the case of Gibson v. Leonard.25 In
Gibson, the appellant was an on-duty fire fighter who fell and injured
himself when the elevator he was riding broke and crashed to the
ground. 26 The court refused to allow the fireman to recover from
19. See Griffith v. Southland Corp., 94 Md. App. 242, 258-59, 617 A.2d 598, 606
(1992), aff'd, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
20. See Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741,
751, 556 A.2d 1126, 1131 (1989); Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 307
Md. 527, 531, 515 A.2d 756, 758 (1986); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
21. Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 241, 492 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1985); Scott v.
Watson, 278 Md. 160, 165, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976).
22. Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925).
23. Although the name suggests otherwise, the fireman's rule applies equally to
police officers. See Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Ptnshp., 308 Md. 432,
442 n.4, 520 A.2d 361, 366 n.4 (1987). There are, however, significant problems
with applying the rule to both fire fighters and police officers. Although it is
generally clear that when applying the rule to fire fighters, the act of negligence
is one that requires the officer's presence, it is less clear with police officers.
Police officers, by the nature of their job, are required to confront numerous
types of difficult and disorderly persons. It is thus difficult to determine when
a police officer goes beyond the scope of his or her "anticipated occupational
risk." See infra note 58 and accompanying discussion of exceptions to the
rule.
24. Flowers, 308 Md. at 446-47, 520 A.2d at 368.
25. 32 N.E. 182 (111. 1892).
26. Id. at 183.
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the landowner for his injuries, even though the landowner may have
been negligent. 27 The court analyzed the duty of the landowner to
keep the premises safe for the fire fighter in terms of premises
liability,2 stating that at the time the fire fighters entered the prem-
ises, they were licensees on -the property. 29 The license to be on the
property, the court stated, arose not from permission by the land-
owner, but rather from the public at large, as the fire fighter was
on the land by public right, for the protection of the public.30 Finding
that the landowner owed the fire fighter no greater duty than to any
other licensee, the court stated that
[iut is the well-settled doctrine that a mere naked license or
permission to enter premises does not impose an obligation
on the owner or person in possession to provide against the
dangers of accident; and it surely cannot detract from the
applicability of the rule that the license or permission has
its origin in a source other than such owner or person in
possession."
Thus, the court in Gibson resolved the issue of the landowner's
liability to a fire fighter in favor of the landowner, based strictly on
the fire fighter's status on the land.32 This holding became popularly
known as the fireman's rule.33
Since Gibson, nearly every state has adopted the fireman's rule.34
Three different rationales are used to explain the fireman's rule: (1)
common law premises liability, (2) assumption of risk, and (3) public
policy. 35 The rule as originally adopted by most states was based
upon premises liability. This common-law rationale has been attacked








33. See David L. Strauss, Comment, "Where There's Smoke, There's the Fire-
fighter's Rule: Containing the Conflagration After One Hundred Years," 1992
Wis. L. REV. 2031 (1992).
34. Id. at 2032. States that have not adopted the fireman's rule include Arkansas,
Massachusetts, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id. at 2032 n.6.
35. See Carpenter v. O'Day, 562 A.2d 595, 596, aff'd, 553 A.2d 638 (Del. 1988).
36. Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Ptnshp., 308 Md. 432, 444, 520 A.2d
361, 367 (1987). According to the court, the use of the premises liability theory
as the basis for the rule ostensibly limits its application to the landowner
context. Id. As tort law developed, other tort theories seemed more appropriate
to serve the purpose of the rule, such as public policy and assumption of risk.
Id. at 445, 520 A.2d at 367.
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Under the premises liability theory, fire fighters and police
officers were held to be licensees, not invitees. 7 An invitee is defined
as
a person invited or permitted to enter or remain on another's
property for purposes connected with or related to the
owner's business; the owner must use reasonable and ordi-
nary care to keep his premises safe for the invitee and to
protect him from injury caused by an unreasonable risk
which the invitee, by exercising ordinary care for his own
safety, will not discover. 8
A licensee is "one who enters the property with the knowledge and
consent of the owner but for his own purposes or interest; the owner
owes no duty to a licensee under the traditional common law view
except to abstain from wilful or wanton misconduct or entrapment." 9
As long as police officers and fire fighters were deemed by the courts
to be licensees, a property owner owed them no duty of care except
to avoid wanton and wilful injuries and entrapment.4 0
Recognizing the difficulty in classifying fire fighters as licensees,
the Supreme Court of Illinois in Dini v. Naiditch4' stated that
[i]t is highly illogical to say that a fireman who enters the
premises quite independently of either invitation or consent
cannot be an invitee because there has been no invitation,
but can be a licensee even though there has been no per-
mission. The lack of logic is even more patent when we
realize that the courts have not applied the term "licensee"
to other types of public employees required to come on
another's premises in the performance of their duties, and
to whom the duty of reasonable care is owed. If benefit to
the landowner is the decisive factor, it is difficult to perceive
why a fireman is not entitled to that duty of care, or how
the landowner derives a greater benefit from the visit of
other public officials, such as postmen, water meter readers
and revenue inspectors, than from the fireman who comes
to prevent the destruction of his property.
37. Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 242, 384 A.2d 76, 79 (1978).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Id. One explanation for classifying fire fighters and police officers as licensees
rather than invitees is that they are likely to enter the premises at unforeseeable
times, upon unusual parts of the premises, and under emergency circumstances,
such that it would be a heavy burden on landowners to require them to make
the premises reasonably safe. Id. at 243, 384 A.2d at 79.
41. 170 N.E.2d 881 (Il1. 1960).
19941
Baltimore Law Review
Consequently, it is our opinion that since the common-law
rule labelling firemen as licensees is but an illogical anach-
ronism, originating in a vastly different social order, and
pock-marked by judicial refinements, it should not be per-
petuated in the name of "stare decisis.
' '42
Due to these difficulties of classifying fire fighters and police
officers as licensees, most states have abandoned the use of the
premises liability theory as the basis for the rule. 43 Instead, these
jurisdictions now base the rule on the assumption of risk doctrine,
and more often, on the theory of public policy." Some states aban-
doned the common-law classifications with respect to the fireman's
rule only when they abandoned premises liability principles in their
entire tort jurisprudence.45 Other states have held that fire fighters
and police officers are in a class sui generis for the purposes of
applying the rule. 46
The second basis for the fireman's rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, 47 is premised on the logic that fire fighters and police
officers, as persons trained to deal with dangerous situations, assume
all of the known risks inherent in the hazards they are trained to
confront. 48 By assuming these risks, firemen and police officers
cannot thereafter recover because they are injured in the process. In
Krauth v. Geller,49 the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly explained
the policy reasons behind the modern trend away from premises
liability and toward assumption of risk. In a frequently quoted
opinion, the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote
in Krauth:
[I]t is the fireman's business to deal with that very hazard
and hence, perhaps by analogy to the contractor engaged
as an expert to remedy dangerous situations, he cannot
complain of negligence in the creation of the very occasion
for his engagement .. . .Probably most fires are attribut-
able to negligence, and in the final analysis the policy
42. Id. at 885 (citations omitted).
43. See generally Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Ptnshp., 308 Md. 432, 444-
45, 520 A.2d 361, 367 (1987).
44. Id.
45. See Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976).
46. See Carpenter v. O'Day, 562 A.2d 595, 598 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988); Buren v.
Midwest Indus., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); Shypulski v. Waldorf
Paper Prods. Co., 45 N.W.2d 549, 550 (Minn. 1951); Krauth v. Geller, 157
A.2d 129, 130 (N.J. 1960); Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., 349 S.E.2d
106, 110 (Va. 1986).
47. See Note, Assumption of Risk and the Fireman's Rule, 7 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 749 (1981).
48. See Carpenter v. O'Day, 562 A.2d 595, 598-99 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988).
49. 157 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1960).
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decision is that it would be too burdensome to charge all
who carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires with the injuries
suffered by the expert retained with public funds to deal
with those inevitable, although negligently created, occurr-
ences.s0
Jurisdictions have abandoned the assumption of risk doctrine in
favor of a comparative negligence analysis in general tort law.
Likewise, many also have abandoned this theory as a basis for the
fireman's rule.5
The latest trend in most jurisdictions that have retained the
fireman's rule52 is to base the rule on grounds of public policy.
Although the specific policy reasons articulated vary from state to
state5 3 most courts have focused on the nature of the relationship
between fire fighters and police officers and the public they serve.1
4
Fire fighters and police officers are employed and trained at the
taxpayers' expense for the express purpose of dealing with the in-
evitable negligence of the public." In addition to it being unfair to
require the public to pay for the hazard that the police and fire
fighters knowingly confront as part of their job, it would also subject
the taxpayer to paying once for the officer to confront the hazard,
and then again for injuries sustained as a result.16 Instead, police
officers and fire fighters often receive special compensation and
benefits as recognition for the hazardous nature of their occupa-
tions. 7
50. Id. at 131.
51. Id.
52. Several states have recently abrogated the rule. See FLA. STAT. ch. 112.182
(1990); MINN. STAT. § 604.06 (1983 & Supp. 1987); Wills v. Bath Excavating,
829 P.2d 405, 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd and remanded, 847 P.2d 1141
(Colo. 1993); Banyai v. Arruda, 799 P.2d 441, 442-43 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990);
Christenson v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210, 1218 (Or. 1984). Some jurisdictions
have also refused to expand the rule beyond premises liability law to public
policy. See, e.g., Court v. Grelinski, 379 N.E.2d 281 (111. 1978).
53. The most common policy considerations were summarized in Christenson v.
Murphy as follows:
1) To avoid placing too heavy a burden on premises owners, to keep
their premises safe from the unpredictable entrance of fire fighters;
2) To spread the risk of fire fighters' injuries to the public through
workers' compensation, salary and fringe benefits; 3) To encourage
the public to call for professional help and not rely on self-help in
emergency situations; 4) To avoid increased litigation.
678 P.2d 1210, 1217 (Or. 1984). This court proceeded to abolish the fireman's
rule. Id. at 1217-18.
54. See generally Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Ptnshp., 308 Md. 432, 447-
48, 520 A.2d 361, 368 (1987).
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The fireman's rule is not, however, without its limits. Case law
from every state that addresses the rule demonstrates that the rule is
pock-marked with exceptions. One limitation bars recovery from the
negligence that required the officer's presence at the scene. 8 "Thus
a police officer who while placing a ticket on an illegally parked car
is struck by a speeding vehicle may maintain action against the
speeder but the rule bars recovery against the owner of the parked
car for negligently parking." 5 9
Another exception allows recovery in situations where the officer
must confront an ultra-hazardous situation or a "hidden danger."
6
0
For example, in Lipson v. Superior Court of Orange County,61 fire
fighters arrived at a boilover at a chemical plant. 62 The owner told
the fire fighters that there were no toxic chemicals in the building.
6
When fumes from toxic chemicals in the building injured the fire
fighters, the court held that the owner's misrepresentation as to the
presence of toxic chemicals in the building was a subsequent act of
58. See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 610 (Cal. 1977). The principles of
the fireman's rule are the same as in all of tort law-that one who knowingly
confronts a hazard cannot recover for injuries caused by that hazard. This is
sometimes called the "original negligence" test, distinguishing between the
original negligence the officer is called to confront, and subsequent or inde-
pendent acts of negligence. See generally Berko v. Freda, 459 A.2d 663 (N.J.
1983) (discussing the different kinds of negligence that may be covered by the
fireman's rule).
59. Walters, 571 P.2d at 611 n.2.
60. See, e.g., Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965) (incorrect
.storage of acetone caused an unexpected "flash" that caused firefighter's
injuries). This exception is sometimes explained in terms of "ultra-hazardous
activity," such as incorrect storage of acetone or a known fire hazard, and
other times in terms of a "hidden danger," where, for example, an owner
misrepresents the presence of toxic chemicals in a burning building. See infra
note 61 and accompanying text. Although they are often interchangeable, there
may be times when one formulation of the exception is more accurate than
the other. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84
(1993) (although it was alleged that the failure to call 911 was a "hidden
danger," it would be illogical to call it an "ultra-hazardous activity"). This
exception is also explained in terms of an act of negligence subsequent to the
original act of negligence (e.g., fire) that required the officer's presence. See
infra note 80. It is difficult to break the exceptions down because they do not
fit into neat categories, and the rationale given may not always be the only
possible way of avoiding the fireman's rule. For example, in Lipson v. Superior
Court of Orange County, John Berger, real party in interest, argued that the
presence of chemicals made the act of fire fighting an ultra-hazardous activity.
Lipson v. Superior Court of Orange County, 644 P.2d 822, 830 (Cal. 1982).
The court held, however, that the act of misrepresenting the presence of toxic
chemicals was an act of negligence after the original act of negligence. Id. at
827.
61. 644 P.2d 822 (Cal. 1982).
62. Id. at 824.
63. Id.
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negligence, and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a motion for
summary judgment by the owner. 64 Because the injuries incurred were
caused by an act of negligence other than what the fire fighters were
called upon to confront, 65 the court did not apply the fireman's
rule.66
A third exception to the fireman's rule is the "intentional tort"
test, followed by New York. 67 This test makes a distinction between
acts of negligence and intentional torts committed against a fire
fighter or police officer. The test bars recovery for negligent acts,
but permits recovery for intentional torts.68 In Christiano v. Mari-
naccio,69 the Supreme Court of Westchester County, New York
permitted a police officer to recover after being intentionally shot in
the face and arm while attempting to calm a couple involved in a
domestic argument. 70 The court stated that basic tort principles
require that one who intentionally harms another should be subject
to liability for that action, notwithstanding the fireman's rule. 7'
The existence of so many exceptions to the fireman's rule created
by courts around the country demonstrates that courts recognize that
no single, bright-line articulation of the rule can possibly encompass
every scenario. The rule, under any rationale, is harsh, as it precludes
police officers and fire fighters from recovering for injuries caused
by another's negligence. This is true even though other public servants
have the full range of tort remedies available to them.72 As an
attempt to mitigate the harshness of the rule, courts have carved out
exceptions to permit injured officers to recover under certain circum-
stances. The exceptions arise most frequently where the landowner
is guilty of some kind of gross negligence, and the injuries, but for
that gross negligence, are avoidable. As in other states across the
country, Maryland courts have had great difficulty in finding an
64. Id. at 832-33.
65. Here, the injuries were "caused" by the misrepresentation of the owner as to
the presence of toxic chemicals, not the actual "boilover," which originally
caused the fire. Id. at 827.
66. Lipson, 644 P.2d at 826, 832-33.
67. See Cristiano v. Marinaccio, 548 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); see
also Lang v. Glusica, 393 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1986); Mahoney v. Carus
Chemical Co., 510 A.2d 4, 9-12 (N.J. 1986).
68. See Cristiano, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
69. 548 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
70. Id. at 379.
71. Id. at 380. Like other cases limiting the application of the fireman's rule, the
New York court seems to be mitigating the harshness of the rule by allowing
police officers and fire fighters to recover in certain instances. Similarly,
however, the court failed to justify why police officers and fire fighters should
be held to a different tort standard than other public servants.
72. See infra note 86.
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adequate and rational basis for actual application of the fireman's
rule.
B. The Rule in Maryland
The fireman's rule in Maryland, like in other jurisdictions, was
initially based upon a premises liability theory, whereby a fire fighter
or police officer was classified as a licensee instead of an invitee,
and could therefore not recover from the landowner.73 As early as
1965, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged that
there are difficulties inherent in utilizing the premises liability theory
as the basis for the fireman's rule.
74
In Aravanis v. Eisenberg7 5 a fire started when Eisenberg knocked
a tool off his work bench which hit a jug of acetone. 76 The acetone
came in contact with the pilot light of a hot water heater nearby
and caught on fire.77 While fighting the fire, Aravanis, a fire fighter
called to the scene, was severely burned by a sudden flash.78 Aravanis
alleged that his injuries were a result, not of the fire itself, but of
the defendant's negligent storage of the acetone. 79 Additionally, the
fire fighter argued that the anticipated occupational risk of fire
fighting was over before the flash that burned him occurred.80
While maintaining premises liability as the basis for the fireman's
rule in Maryland, the Aravanis court struggled with the injustice of
precluding the fire fighter from recovery.8 The court suggested that
the status of a fire fighter could change from licensee to invitee,
thus imposing a greater duty on the landowner, which would in turn
result in compensation by the landowner for the fire fighter's inju-
ries.82 The court stated that it is "after the initial period of his
73. Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925).
74. Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 248,-206 A.2d 148, 151 (1965) ("The
criticism of what was formerly the almost universal rule is based essentially
upon making the determination of what is justice between the parties depend
upon cramming firemen into the inflexible legal category of licensee.").
75. 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
76. Id. at 247, 206 A.2d at 151.
77. Id.
78. Id. Although it was not explained in the case, the "flash" apparently resulted
from the burning acetone.
79. Id. at 253-54, 206 A.2d at 154; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
This is a formulation of the "original negligence" theory, whereby the negligent
storage of the acetone was an independent act of negligence, apart from the
negligent starting of the fire.
80. Aravanis, 237 Md. at 253-54, 206 A.2d at 154-55.
81. Id. at 250-52, 206 A.2d at 153-54.
82. Id. at 254, 206 A.2d at 155. The court stated that "[tlhe balancing of the
scales of justice as between fireman and property owner, it is suggested, may
shift with the place in which the fireman is injured and also, perhaps, with
[Vol. 24
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anticipated occupational risk, or from perils not reasonably foresee-
able as part of that risk, that the justice of continuing to regard him
as a licensee only is questioned." 83
The decision in Aravanis was the first in Maryland to suggest
that the fireman's rule was based on something other than strict
status classification. In its holding, the court asserted what appears
to be a public policy rationale for the rule, rather than a premises
liability rationale. The court stated that "[flighting the fire, however
caused, is his occupation. Compensation for injuries sustained in the
fulfillment of his duties, absent other circumstances, is the obligation
of society." '8 4 The court never reached the issue of whether the fire
fighter's status should, in fact, change from licensee to invitee, thus
allowing recovery, because it found that the jury instructions given
were no less favorable than they would have been if the court had
found the change in status the fire fighter requested, and the jury
had found for the defendants.85
It took the Court of Appeals of Maryland thirteen years to
reexamine the proper application of the fireman's rule.86 In Sherman
v. Suburban Trust Co.,87 Sherman, a police officer, responded to a
call from a bank where someone had attempted to pass a forged
check. 8 While watching the apprehended suspect from a small teller's
cage, Sherman bent over to pick up the check that the clerk had
accidentally dropped, and in the process injured his back on the coin
changing machine.8 9 The court accepted the possibility that the of-
ficer's status could change from licensee to invitee as suggested in
Aravanis,9° but held that Sherman's injury took place during the
period of his anticipated occupational risk, and thus precluded the
officer from recovery. 91 Although it appeared after Aravanis that the
court would begin to develop a basis other than premises liability
for the fireman's rule, the court in Sherman failed to provide any
further guidance on this matter.
the stage in the execution of the fireman's duties when the injury occurs." Id.
at 250, 206 A.2d at 153. Further, the court stated that "[wle have recognized
that there may be a change of status, 'geographical or chronological,' of one
who starts as an invitee .... [T]here is no reason in logic or justice, when
circumstances warrant, why the transmutation cannot be from licensee to
invitee." Id. at 253, 206 A.2d at 154 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 252, 206 A.2d at 153-54.
84. Id. at 251, 206 A.2d at 153.
85. Id. at 254, 206 A.2d at 155.
86. Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978).
87. 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978).
88. Id. at 239, 384 A.2d at 78.
89. Id. at 240, 384 A.2d at 78.
90. Id. at 244, 384 A.2d at 80.
91. Id. at 246, 384 A.2d at 81.
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Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnership,92 however,
represented a significant evolution of the fireman's rule in Maryland
by establishing that the proper basis for the rule is public policy. 93
In Flowers, a fire fighter responding to an alarm fell through an
open elevator shaft while attempting to evacuate the building. 94 The
court prohibited recovery for the fire fighter under the rule, but
refused to base its rationale on premises liability. 95 The Flowers court
specified several problems underlying the premises liability rationale
for the fireman's rule. 96 Notably, the court was concerned that the
rule, as explained under the premises liability theory, did not encom-
pass the negligence of someone other than the landowner. Although
the defendants, an elevator and a security guard company, were not
landowners, the court invoked the rule anyway. 97 Moreover, the court
pointed out that other public officers, such as postmen and building
inspectors, are owed a duty of due care against other persons'
negligence, while their counterparts, police officers and fire fighters,
are not, because the court has deemed them to be licensees. 98 As a
result of these inconsistencies, the Flowers court concluded that the
fireman's rule is best explained by a public policy rationale. 99
Instead of continuing to use a rationale based on the law
of premises liability, we hold that, as a matter of public
policy, firemen and police officers generally cannot recover
for injuries attributable to the negligence that requires their
assistance. This public policy is based on a relationship
between firemen and policemen and the public that calls on
these safety officers specifically to confront certain hazards
on behalf of the public. A fireman or police officer may
not recover if injured by the negligently created risk that
was the very reason for his presence on the scene in his
occupational capacity. 00
The court cautioned that not all actions for negligence would
be precluded by the fireman's rule.' 0 For example, the rule does not
cover "pre-existing hidden dangers where.there was knowledge of
the danger [by the tortfeasor] and an opportunity to warn ....
[Other examples] include acts which occur subsequent to the safety
92. 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
93. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
94. Id. at 436-37, 520 A.2d at 363.
95. Id. at 443, 520 A.2d at 366.
96. Id. at 443-44, 520 A.2d at 366.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 444, 520 A.2d at 366-67.
99. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
100. Id. at 447-48, 520 A.2d at 368.
101. Id. at 448, 520 A.2d at 368-69.
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officer's arrival on the scene and which are outside of his anticipated
occupational hazards."1 02
The Flowers rule was subsequently applied by the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland in Flood v. Attsgood Realty.03 In
Flood, a police officer, responding to a call regarding possible
narcotic activity in a vacant house, was injured when he fell through
a hole in the second floor.'04 In a brief opinion, citing Flowers for
the proposition that Maryland follows the modern trend of rejecting
premises liability in favor of a public policy rationale, the interme-
diate appellate court stated that
[iJn the case sub judice, the appellant was clearly within the
performance of his duties when he was injured. The only
reason the appellant was on the premises was to investigate
possible drug activity there and to search for a suspect.
Under [the Flowers rule], . . . being in an admittedly unsafe
and generally uninhabitable building looking for a drug
suspect was a risk that the appellant assumed, on behalf of
the public, when he accepted employment as a police officer,
and therefore the appellee owed him no duty to make the
premises safe. 105
Thus, public policy clearly remained the proper rationale underlying
the fireman's rule in Maryland until Griffith.
C. -Duty to Aid
After addressing the issue of whether or not the fireman's rule
applied, the Griffith court addressed a second issue, whether the
clerk at the 7-11 had a duty to aid the police officer.' °6 Under the
common law, a private person is generally under no duty to assist
another person in distress. 10 7 The Second Restatement of the Law of
Torts states the general rule that "[t]he fact that the actor realizes
or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's
aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action."10
Section 314A of the Second Restatement, however, carves out
specific exceptions to this rule by establishing special relationships
that give rise to an affirmative duty to aid or protect others in
distress.1' 9 Examples of such special relationships include common
102. Id. at 448, 520 A.2d at 369.
103. 92 Md. App. 520, 608 A.2d 1297 (1992).
104. Id. at 523, 608 A.2d at 1299.
105. Id. at 527, 608 A.2d at 1301.
106. Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 715-16, 633 A.2d 84, 85 (1993).
107. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (1976); see infra notes
108-10.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
109. Id. § 314A (1965); see infra note 110 for the text of § 314A.
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carrier to passenger, innkeeper to guest, and a possessor of land who
holds it open to the public to those who enter the land in response
to that invitation."1
0
Various jurisdictions have further held that a special relationship
giving rise to an affirmative duty to aid exists between a shopkeeper
and business invitee"'1 Recognizing this special relationship would
give rise to an affirmative duty on the part of the shopkeeper to aid
a business invitee in distress. For example, in Jones v. Kwik Karol
and Ginalco, Inc., 12 an attendant at a convenience store was informed
that one of the customers was being harassed."' The attendant refused
to notify the police, and shortly thereafter the customer was severely
beaten." 4 The Louisiana high court ruled that the store owner had
a duty to take reasonable precautions for the safety of his patrons
and that this duty was breached by the attendant's failure to act
when asked to call the police." 5
The Supreme Court of Wyoming reached a similar result in
Drew v. LeJay's Sportsmen's Cafe, Inc." 6 In that case, employees
of a restaurant failed to promptly obtain medical assistance for a
choking patron."' The court in Drew held that the restaurant owed
its customer a duty to summon medical assistance within a reasonable
time." 8 The court declined, however, to adopt section 314A of the
Second Restatement of Torts because it felt the duty to aid did not
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). This section provides in full:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take
reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm,
and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know
that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they
can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a
similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his
invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other
of his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to
the other.
Id.
111. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56,
at 376 (5th ed. 1984).
112. 490 So. 2d 664 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
113. Id. at 665.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 666.
116. 806 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1991).
117. Id. at 302-03.
118. Id. at 305.
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extend to a duty to actually provide medical assistance, only to call
for it."19
Although Maryland courts have held that there is a special
relationship between a common carrier and its passengers,'20 the
shopkeeper/business invitee exception was not adopted until 1993.121
Southland Corp. v. Griffith2 2 was the first Maryland case to address
this special relationship.
III. THE INSTANT CASE
David Griffith, an off-duty police officer, his son, and several
friends purchased food at a 7-11 convenience store.'23 After returning
to his car in the parking lot of the store, Griffith saw several teenagers
throwing beer bottles and harassing a female passenger waiting in
Griffith's car.'2 4 Griffith attempted to arrest the teenagers and was
severely beaten in the process. 125 Griffith filed suit in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County against the Southland Corporation,
which owned the convenience store, and the three men who assaulted
him in the parking lot of the store. 126 Griffith claimed that his son
had asked the store clerk to call the police for backup on three
occasions during the confrontation, but the clerk failed to make the
call promptly. 2 7 The defendant Southland Corporation moved for
summary judgment "because the so-called 'fireman's rule' . . . pre-
cluded recovery in a negligence action against it by a police officer
injured by a negligently created risk that was the very reason for the
officer's presence on the scene. ''128 The trial judge agreed and granted
summary judgment in favor of Southland.'
29
119. Id. at 306. The Wyoming court cited other jurisdictions that also acknowledged
a special relationship between a shopkeeper and a business invitee, but did not
find them instructive to the case at hand. See Personal Representative Estate
of Starling v. Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1981) (holding that
a business owner has a duty to render aid to a person exposed to a known
danger); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 271 S.E.2d
335 (W. Va. 1980) (holding that a shopkeeper owes a duty to render aid to
an invitee after he knows or had reason to know the invitee is ill or injured).
120. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 166-67, 358 A.2d 548, 552 (1976) (holding that
a landlord has no special duty to protect tenants from crimes perpetrated on
the landlord's premises by third parties).
121. Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 719, 633 A.2d 84, 91 (1993).
122. 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
123. Id. at 707, 633 A.2d at 85.
124. Id. at 707-08, 633 A.2d at 85.
125. Id. at 708, 633 A.2d at 85-86.
126. 94 Md. App. 242, 248, 617 A.2d 598, 601 (1992), aff'd, 332 Md. 707, 633
A.2d 84 (1993).
127. Id. at 247, 617 A.2d at 601.
128. Griffith, 332 Md. at 708-09, 633 A.2d at 86.
129. Id. at 710, 633 A.2d at 87.
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The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the summary
judgment, holding that Southland could be liable to the police officer,
notwithstanding the fireman's rule, for its employee's failure to call
911 when requested. 30 The court had two bases for this conclusion.
First, the court of special appeals held that the fireman's rule does
not preclude recovery in instances where the officer is injured by
events which are outside his anticipated occupational hazard.," The
court recognized Flowers' holding that certain acts of negligence are
not protected by the fireman's rule. a2 The intermediate court then
stated, "[w]hen we apply [the Flowers] principles to the case sub
judice, it is crystal clear . . . [that the clerk's] refusal to act was an
event in the nature of a 'hidden danger' that no police officer in
this day and age could possibly anticipate."'3
Second, the court of special appeals ruled that Maryland public
policy demands that the public not ignore "the legitimate plea of an
officer in trouble. '1 4 The court argued that ignoring the officer's
plea for assistance would be contrary to the State's interest in
providing its citizens with rapid and effective police and fire protec-
tion. 5 The court made it clear that it would not impose a general
duty to come to the aid of a stranger, but announced the very narrow
rule that
when a police officer is in danger during the performance
of his or her duties protecting patrons on the premises of
a business, and requests, directly or indirectly, that an
130. Griffith v. Southland Corp., 94 Md. App. 242, 617 A.2d 598 (1992), aff'd,
332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
131. Id. at 252-53, 617 A.2d at 603-04.
132. Id. at 253, 617 A.2d at 603.
133. Id. at 253, 617 A.2d at 603-04.
134. Id. at 256, 617 A.2d at 605.
135. Id. The Griffith court referred to § 18-101 of Article 41 of the Maryland Code
to illustrate Maryland's demonstrated interest in providing its citizens with
rapid and effective fire and police protection. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 18-
101 (1990). Section 18-101 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The General Assembly recognizes the paramount importance of
the safety and well-being of the citizens of Maryland and further
recognizes that when the lives or property of its citizens are in
imminent danger, timely and appropriate assistance must be rendered.
(c) The General Assembly is concerned that avoidable delays in
reaching appropriate emergency aid are occurring to the jeopardy of
life and property.
(e) It is the purpose of this subtitle to establish the three digit number,
911, as the primary emergency telephone number for the State of
Maryland ....
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employee of the business who is not in the path of danger
summon aid via the 911 system, then that employee has a
legal obligation to do so promptly.
3 6
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the holding of the
court of special appeals, but on different grounds.3 7 The high court
rejected the intermediate court's contention that the failure of the
clerk to call 911 when requested was a hidden danger not reasonably
anticipated by an officer. 38 The court held that the danger was not
hidden, and therefore did not fall under the hidden danger exception
to the fireman's rule, but rather was a reasonably anticipated occu-
pational hazard officers are aware of when arresting disorderly
individuals. ,39
Despite this finding, the court dismissed the fireman's rule as
inapplicable for other reasons. 4° The court reasoned that the police
officer entered the store as a customer for the purpose of purchasing
food, and thus, was a "business invitee" to whom the shopkeeper
owed a duty of care.' 4' Based on this fact, the court held that the
fireman's rule did not preclude Griffith from recovery.'
42
The Maryland high court concluded that the only issue remaining
was whether Southland had a legal duty to come to Griffith's aid
by promptly calling the police for assistance. 4 Although the court
recognized that generally there is no common-law duty to aid a
person in distress, it also noted that other jurisdictions have adopted
exceptions to this rule based on the existence of a "special relation-
ship" between the parties. 44 As a result, the Maryland court adopted
section 314A of the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts for the
proposition that:
136. Griffith, 94 Md. App. at 258-59, 617 A.2d at 606. The court did not find a
conflict between this holding and the spirit of the fireman's rule.
Here, we have no prior judicial ruling that conflicts with our holding
in this case. Maryland first recognized the "fireman's rule" in a day
and a time when there was no need for an emergency telephone
system-a day and a time when the societal demands and needs were
as different as the biplane of yesteryear is from the spaceship of
today.
Id. at 258, 617 A.2d at 606.
137. Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
138. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 719, 633 A.2d at 89. It is interesting to note that the court does not
address the issue of whether Griffith was on or off duty. See supra note 12.
142. Griffith, 332 Md. at 719, 633 A.2d at 89.
143. Id. at 716, 633 A.2d at 89.
144. Id. at 716-17, 633 A.2d at 90.
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[A]n employee of a business has a legal duty to take
affirmative action for the aid or protection of a business
invitee who is in danger while on the business's premises,
provided that the employee has knowledge of the injured
invitee and the employee is not in the path of danger.1
45
In so doing, the court determined that neither the fact that Griffith
was an off-duty police officer,'4 nor his attempt to arrest his
assailants147 impacted upon his status as a business invitee. Concluding
that a legal duty was owed to Griffith by the store, the court held
that the entry of summary judgment for Southland was incorrect. 148
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The fireman's rule is harsh, and it is often difficult to reconcile
a bar to recovery with the important public safety function police
officers and fire fighters perform. The rule prevents an injured public
servant from recovering damages for his or her injuries caused by
an admittedly negligent tortfeasor. Such a drastic divergence from
ordinary principles of tort law, which otherwise allow recovery, ought
to be limited in scope to those instances where public policy demands
such a result.
Maryland courts, like others around the country, have encoun-
tered significant difficulties in applying the fireman's rule., 49 The
rule's evolution from a premises liability basis to a public policy
basis was an attempt by the courts to move away from rigid, arbitrary
classifications of liability to a more flexible and just approach.5 0 The
145. Id. at 719, 633 A.2d at 91. The court found illustration five of the Second
Restatement of Torts § 314A instructive:
A, a patron attending a play in B's theater, suffers a heart attack
during the performance, and is disabled and unable to move. He asks
that a doctor be called. B's employees do nothing to obtain medical
assistance, or to remove A to a place where it can be obtained. As a
result, A's illness is aggravated in a manner which reasonable prompt
medical attention would have avoided. B is subject to liability to A
for aggravation of his illness.
Id. at 719 n.8, 633 A.2d at 91 n.8 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314A (1965)).
146. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 720, 633 A.2d at 92.
149. See generally Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993);
Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978); Aravanis
v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
150. See generally Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993);
Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978); Aravanis
v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
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Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Southland Corp. v. Griffith,5'
focused on the purpose for which the officer was on the premises as
the rationale for determining whether the fireman's rule applied.
15 2
This focus, however, presents the same difficulties that the Flowers
court attempted to eradicate by holding that the proper basis for the
rule is public policy. By resurrecting the premises liability theory in
Griffith, the fireman's rule will once again be subject to an unclear
standard for application and produce the unjust results that Flowers
had once successfully avoided."'
Concentrating on the purpose of the officer's presence, as the
court of appeals did in Griffith,54 ostensibly reverts back to the
premises liability test. Although the court in Griffith recognized that
Flowers rejected the emphasis on the officer's status on the land, 55
the court still relied on premises liability in reaching its conclusion,
stating that "[tihe fireman's rule is not applicable [because]...
[Griffith] entered the store as a customer for the sole purpose of
purchasing food. He was at that time, under our cases, a 'business
invitee' to whom the store owner owed a duty to use reasonable and
ordinary care."'15 6 With this, the court summarily rejected any analysis
of public policy and instead held the fireman's rule inapplicable
because of the officer's "status" on the land.
5 7
Judge Bloom's dissenting opinion of the intermediate appellate
court's decision, correctly pointed out why the Court of special
appeals' focus was incorrect in Griffith:
[S]ince the rule is based upon public policy grounds, it is
immaterial that appellant was already on the premises, as a
patron, when the incident that required him to act in the
capacity of a police office arose. He was injured in the
performance of his duty; the hazard he encountered was
one his duty required him to confront. There is no sugges-
tion that appellee did anything to injure or entrap him, or
151. 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
152. Id. at 715-16, 719-20, 633 A.2d at 89, 91-92.
153. See Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Ptnshp., 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361
(1987).
154. Griffith, 332 Md. at 715-16, 719-20, 633 A.2d at 89, 91-92.
155. Id. at 713, 633 A.2d at 88. The Griffith court specifically recognized Flowers'
abandonment of the premises liability theory:
Prior to 1987, the rationale behind the fireman's rule focused on the
status of the safcty officer on the landowner's premises. . . .[Flowers]
departed from traditional principles of landowner's or premises lia-
bility in cases involving fire fighters or police officers, i.e., whether
their status was that of a licensee or invitee.
Id. at 713-14, 633 A.2d at 88.
156. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89.
157. Id. at 715-16, 633 A.2d at 89.
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failed to warn him of any hidden or unexpected peril.'
Thus, as stated in Flowers, the proper approach to analyzing whether
or not the fireman's rule applies, therefore barring the fire fighter
or police officer from recovery, "is an analysis of the relationship
between firemen and the public whom they serve."' 5 9
In Flowers, the court of appeals explained that fire fighters and
police officers generally cannot recover for the negligence that re-
quires their assistance.16° "This public policy is based on a relationship
between firemen and policemen and the public that calls on these
safety officers specifically to confront certain hazards on behalf of
the public.' 1 61 In Griffith, however, the negligence alleged against
Southland Corporation was for failure to call 911 when requested.
162
Griffith argued that if 911 had been called when he first requested,
his injuries would have been less severe. 163 There is no public policy
that would support shielding Southland from liability under the
fireman's rule in this case. The rule deals only with preventing fire
fighters and police officers from recovering when the alleged negli-
gence that was the cause of their injuries is the same negligence they
were trained and called to confront. In the present case, the alleged
negligence, the failure to call 911, was not the "original negligence"
Griffith was duty-bound to confront.
The fireman's rule may have been rightfully rejected in Griffith,
but for the wrong reasons. The flaw in the court's analysis is that
it requires a court to first address the purpose for the officer's
presence on the premises. Premises liability should not be used to
avoid the public policy analysis outlined in Flowers. An analysis
more consistent with the Flowers approach would first determine if
the officer is barred from recovery under the fireman's rule. This
question must address the relationship between the officer and the
public-whether the officer was injured while dealing with a hazard
he was duty bound to confront, or whether he was injured from a
negligent act collateral to the original negligence. If the fireman's
rule does apply, the officer may not recover for public policy
reasons-because he cannot recover for negligence inherent in his
duties, and the question of liability is resolved. If, however, he is
not barred from recovery under the fireman's rule, because the
negligence can be distinguished from his occupational duties, the
158. Griffith v. Southland Corp., 94 Md. App. 242, 262, 617 A.2d 598, 608 (1992).
159. Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Ptnshp., 308 Md. 432, 444, 520 A.2d
361, 367 (1987).
160. Id. at 446-48, 520 A.2d at 368.
161. Id. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
162. Griffith, 332 Md. at 713, 633 A.2d at 88.
163. Id. at 709, 633 A.2d at 86.
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court should then determine whether there is a basis for recovery
under any other tort principles.
Focusing merely on the purpose for the officer's presence, as
the Griffith court did, is likely to lead to inconsistent applications
of the rule and unjust results. For example, an on-duty police officer
enters a convenience store for a cup of coffee, is confronted by an
armed robber, and is injured in the process because the clerk failed
to call for assistance promptly. Under the Flowers test, the fireman's
rule would shield the store from liability if such danger was a
reasonably anticipated occupational hazard. 164 According to the court
of appeals in Griffith, however, the purpose of the officer's visit was
to purchase coffee, automatically making him a business invitee to
whom the store owes a duty of due care, regardless of his position
as a police officer, and regardless of public policy. 165 The two
approaches to the same scenario reach contradictory results.
Clearly, approaching this scenario first from the perspective of
premises liability, and not from the proper application of the fire-
man's rule, may lead to unfair and inconsistent results. The rationale
of Griffith is inconsistent with the rule established in Flowers to the
extent that it bases its analysis on premises liability, rather than
public policy. For this reason, it is likely to be a source of confusion
for lower courts attempting to apply the fireman's rule.
In addition, the court of appeals failed to address the court of
special appeals' holding that an employee has a duty to call 911
when an officer, in the performance of his duties, requests such
help.166 The court avoided this issue by concluding that the fireman's
rule simply did not apply. 167 The holding of the court of appeals
creates an affirmative duty for shopkeepers to aid business invitees
in trouble. Rarely, however, will a police officer be a business invitee.
Thus, it still remains unclear whether a shopkeeper owes any duty
to summon aid for a police officer who is not a business invitee.
Finally, the court of appeals' conclusion that a shopkeeper has
a duty to aid business invitees under section 314A of the Second
Restatement of Torts leaves questions unanswered. There is no in-
dication of how far a shopkeeper must go to aid a business invitee.
Drew v. LeJay's Sportsmen's Cafe, Inc.,16' for example, cited by the
court of appeals, 169 did not adopt section 314A of the Restatement
because it did not want a shopkeeper to be required to do more than
164. Flowers, 308 Md. at 443, 520 A.2d at 366.
165. Griffith, 332 Md. at 715-16, 633 A.2d at 89.
166. Griffith v. Southland Corp., 94 Md. App. 242, 258-59, 617 A.2d 598, 606
(1992), aff'd, 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
167. Griffith, 332 Md. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89.
168. 806 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1991).
169. Griffith, 332 Md. at 717-18, 633 A.2d at 90.
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summon aid; it did not want a shopkeeper to be required to actually
provide aid. 170 Future Maryland decisions will have to determine
whether or not the duty is a duty to provide aid, or merely a duty
to summon assistance.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of premises liability as the basis for the fireman's rule
has resulted in difficulties for courts applying the rule. Although the
rule's longevity attests to the value of the principles of the rule, the
numerous exceptions to the rule and the difficult application of the
rule in a just manner demonstrate that the premises liability basis is
an inadequate explanation for the rule's principles. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, in Flowers, properly explained the rule in
terms of public policy.
When faced with the injured police officer in Griffith, however,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland muddied the legal waters by
permitting recovery based upon the officer's status on the land-a
premises liability justification. By undermining the rationale of Flow-
ers, the court of appeals has left the standards for applying the
fireman's rule unclear. As a result, many of the problems inherent
in using premises liability as the rationale for the fireman's rule,
recognized in Flowers and its preceding cases, will revisit future
Maryland decisions. Maryland courts will have to determine whether
the Flowers holding was an anomaly and then either accept Griffith
as a return to the premises liability basis, or find some way to
reconcile Griffith with Flowers. In either event, the Maryland courts
should strive for a limited, consistent approach to the rule, that
balances the demands of public policy with justice for fire fighters
and police officers.
Ami C. Dwyer
170. Drew, 806 P.2d at 305.
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